



IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE

&

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. KRISHNA KUMAR

WEDNESDAY, THE 26TH DAY OF MARCH 2025 / 5TH CHAITHRA, 1947

WA NO. 2076 OF 2016

AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 19.07.2016 IN WPC NO.15378 OF

2016 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA

APPELLANT/PETITIONER:

A.K SAMSUDDIN, AGED 71 YEARS
S/O. DR.A.KHALEQUE (LATE), R/O. NO.2/13,
2ND FLOOR, MIZAM OSTAGAR LANE, KOLKATA - 700 017,
(FORMERLY DEPUTY CHIEFCONTROLLER OF EXPLOSIVES,
ERNAKULAM.)

BY ADVS.
SRI.B.RAMAN PILLAI (SR.)
SRI.R.ANIL
SRI.T.ANIL KUMAR
SRI.B.KRISHNA KUMAR
SRI.A.RAJESH
SRI.M.SUNILKUMAR
SRI.SUJESH MENON V.B.
SRI.THOMAS ABRAHAM NILACKAPPILLIL
SRI.M.VIVEK

RESPONDENTS:

1 UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETATY TO GOVERNMENT OF



2025:KER:24506

INDIA,MINISTRY OF FINANCE,
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,6TH FLOOR,
'B' WING, JANPATH BHAVAN,JANPATH,
NEW DELHI - 110 001.

- 2 THE DIRECTOR OF ENFORCEMENT
ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE,
6TH FLOOR,LOK NAYAK BHAVAN,
KHAN MARKET,NEW DELHI - 110 003.
- 3 JOINT DIRECTOR OF ENFORCEMENT
ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE,
COCHIN ZONAL OFFICE,KANOOS CASTLE,
MULLASERY CANAL ROAD, (WEST) ,
COCHIN - 682 011.
- 4 ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE,
COCHIN ZONAL OFFICE,KANOOS CASTLE,
MULLASERY CANAL ROAD (WEST) ,
COCHIN - 682 011.

BY ADV SRI.JAISHANKAR V.NAIR, RC, FOR ED

THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 19.03.2025,
ALONG WITH WP(C)NOS..5562/2017, 5647/2017, 26120/2017 &
8373/2017, THE COURT ON 26.03.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:



IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE

&

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. KRISHNA KUMAR

WEDNESDAY, THE 26TH DAY OF MARCH 2025 / 5TH CHAITHRA, 1947

WP(C) NO. 5562 OF 2017

PETITIONER:

MR. HARSHAD B PATEL, AGED 59 YEARS
S/O.BHAVANBHAI G PATEL,
8 B SUVAS 68 F NEPEAN SEA ROAD,
MUMBAI - 400 006.

BY ADVS.
SRI.BABU KARUKAPADATH
SMT.AMRIN FATHIMA
SRI.K.M.FAISAL KALAMASSERY
SRI.MITHUN BABY JOHN
SRI.J.RAMKUMAR
SMT.M.A.VAHEEDA BABU
SRI.P.U.VINOD KUMAR

RESPONDENT:

THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT,
CALICUT SUB ZONAL OFFICE, 3RD FLOOR,
KENDRIYA BHAVAN, M.S. BABU RAJ ROAD,
KALLAI P.O, CALICUT, KERALA 673 003.



BY ADVS.
SMT.C.G.PREETHA, CGC
SRI.JAISHANKAR V.NAIR, CGC

THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
19.03.2025, ALONG WITH WA.2076/2016 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE
COURT ON 26.03.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:



IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE

&

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. KRISHNA KUMAR

WEDNESDAY, THE 26TH DAY OF MARCH 2025 / 5TH CHAITHRA, 1947

WP(C) NO. 5647 OF 2017

AGAINST THE ORDER DATED IN CC NO.2 OF 2011 OF ENQUIRY

COMMISSIONER& SPECIAL JUDGE,THRISSUR

PETITIONER:

S.VADIVELU,AGED 59 YEARS
AGED 59 YEARS, S/O.SUBHAYA GOUNDER,
FORMER EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR ARK WOOD &METALS PRIVATE
LIMITED, NO.41, ARUCHAMI NAGAR,
MAHALINGAPURAM, POLLACHI, TAMIL NADU-642 001.

BY ADV SRI.K.ANAND

RESPONDENT:

THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
DIRECTOR OF ENFORCEMENT,
CALICUT SUB ZONAL OFFICE,3RD FLOOR,
KENDRIYA BHAVAN, M.S.BABU RAJ ROAD,
KALLAYI PO, CALICUT, KERALA-673 003.

BY ADVS.
SMT.C.G.PREETHA, CGC
SRI.GIRISH KUMAR V



SRI.JAISHANKAR V.NAIR, SC, ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE

**THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
19.03.2025, ALONG WITH WA.2076/2016 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE
COURT ON 26.03.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:**



IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE

&

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. KRISHNA KUMAR

WEDNESDAY, THE 26TH DAY OF MARCH 2025 / 5TH CHAITHRA, 1947

WP(C) NO. 8373 OF 2017

PETITIONER:

CHANDRAMOULI.V
(FORMER PARTNER M/S PIONEER ENTERPRISES)
S/O P. VENKATRAMANI, NOW RESIDING AT HOUSE NO.106,
PONNAYYARAJAPURAM, COIMBATORE-641001.

BY ADVS.
SRI.K.JAJU BABU (SR.)
SRI.RAHUL IPE PRASAD
SMT.M.U.VIJAYALAKSHMI

RESPONDENTS:

- 1 THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
3RD FLOOR, KENDRIYA BHAVAN, M.S BABURAJ ROAD,
KALLAI, CALICUT. 673003.
- 2 UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF
INDIA, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, DEPARTMENT OF
REVENUE, CENTRAL SECRETARIAT, NEW DELHI. 110001.



BY ADVS.

SMT.C.G.PREETHA, CGC

SRI.JAISHANKAR V.NAIR, SC, ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE

**THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
19.03.2025, ALONG WITH WA.2076/2016 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE
COURT ON 26.03.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:**



IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE

&

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. KRISHNA KUMAR

WEDNESDAY, THE 26TH DAY OF MARCH 2025 / 5TH CHAITHRA, 1947

WP(C) NO. 26120 OF 2017

PETITIONER:

MR. NITHIN R, AGED 32 YEARS
S/O RADHAKRISHNAN, NINEETITA, 18/714,
D.P.O., ROAD, BIG BAZAR P.O.,
PALAKKAD, KERALA-678014.

BY ADVS.
RANCE R.
N.RAGHURAJ (SR.) (K/114/1986)
SAYUJYA (K/687-E/2014)
VIVEK MENON (K/001227/2022)

RESPONDENTS:

- 1 THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT,
CALICUT SUB ZONAL OFFICE, 3RD FLOOR,
KENDRIYA BHAVAN, M.S.BABU RAJ ROAD,
KALLAI P.O., CALICUT, KERALA-673003.
- 2 THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR P.M.L.A
ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE,
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, SUB ZONAL OFFICE,
CALICUT-673003.



3 THE JOINT DIRECTOR
 DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT,
 COCHIN ZONAL OFFICE, KOCHI-682011.

BY ADVS.
SMT.C.G.PREETHA, CGC
SRI.JAISHANKAR V.NAIR

THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
19.03.2025, ALONG WITH WA.2076/2016 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE
COURT ON 26.03.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:



CR

JUDGMENT

P.Krishna Kumar, J.

The primary issue in these cases is the constitutional validity of the criminal proceedings initiated under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 ('PMLA', for short). According to the appellant/petitioners, at the time when the act of money laundering was allegedly committed, either **(i)** the PMLA itself was not in force, or **(ii)** the predicate offences were not included in the schedule of the said Act, and thus all the proceedings initiated against them by the Enforcement Directorate are in the teeth of Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India.

2. The Writ Appeal is preferred against the judgment of the Single Bench of this Court, upholding



such an action initiated by the Enforcement Directorate. All the above Writ Petitions are placed before us for disposal together with the Writ Appeal, as the petitioners also challenge the investigation and further proceedings under Section 3 of the PMLA on the above grounds.

3. We heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant/petitioners as well as the Retainer Counsel appearing for the Enforcement Directorate.

4. The question whether the offence of money laundering under Section 3 of the PMLA can be extended to a predicate offence which happened prior to the coming into the force of PMLA or before the inclusion of such offences in the schedule of the PMLA, is no longer *re integra*. In **Vijay Mandalal Chaudharay and Others v. Union of India & Ors.** [(2023) 12 SCC 1], the Apex Court held that it is possible, as the offence under Section 3 is a continuing offence. However, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant/petitioners



forcefully submitted that the question of retrospective application of Section 3 of the PMLA was not directly in question in the said case. However, the Honourable Supreme Court in its judgment dated 17.03.2025 in SLP(Cr1.)6185/2023 (**Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. Directorate of Enforcement & Another**) answered this question pointedly and in the affirmative. The Court held that money laundering is not a static event but an ongoing activity, as long as illicit gains are possessed, projected as legitimate, or reintroduced into the economy and thus if the accused commits any of the acts as defined in Section 3 of the PMLA after its commencement, the Enforcement Directorate could maintain a criminal action against him, irrespective of the fact that the predicate offence allegedly took place before the commencement of the PMLA. The court held thus:

“21. A significant ground raised by the appellant pertains to the nature of the alleged offence under the PMLA. The appellant has contended that



the alleged acts do not constitute an offence under the PMLA as the same was not in force during the relevant period, or the predicate offences as alleged were not included in the schedule to the PMLA at the relevant time and, therefore, cannot be subject to proceedings under the PMLA. It has also been argued that these instances do not constitute continuing offences. This contention, however, is untenable. It is well established that offences under the PMLA are of a continuing nature, and the act of money laundering does not conclude with a single instance but extends so long as the proceeds of crime are concealed, used, or projected as untainted property. The legislative intent behind the PMLA is to combat the menace of money laundering, which by its very nature involves transactions spanning over time.

22. The concept of a continuing offence under PMLA has been well-settled by judicial precedents. An offence is deemed continuing when the illicit act or its consequences persist over time, thereby extending the liability of the offender. Section 3 of the PMLA defines the offence of money laundering to include direct or indirect attempts to indulge in, knowingly assist, or knowingly be a party to, or actually be involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime. Such involvement, if



prolonged, constitutes a continuing offence.

23. Even though the issue of retrospective application of the PMLA is pending adjudication before this Court, the reliance by the respondent on the observation of this Court in Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary (Supra) cannot be said to be misplaced. This Court, in its judgment in this case made the following observations regarding the offence of money laundering and its nature as a continuing offence:

“134. From the bare language of Section 3 of the 2002 Act, it is amply clear that the offence of money laundering is an independent offence regarding the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime which had been derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity relating to or in relation to a scheduled offence. The process or activity can be in any form – be it one of concealment, possession, acquisition, use of proceeds of crime as much as projecting it as untainted property or claiming it to be so. Thus, involvement in any one of such process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime would constitute offence of money laundering. This offence otherwise has nothing to do with the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence – except the proceeds of crime derived or obtained as a result of that crime.

135. Needless to mention that such process or activity can be indulged in only after the property is derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity (a scheduled offence). **It would be an offence of money laundering to indulge in or to assist or being party to the process or activity connected with the proceeds of**



crime; and such process or activity in a given fact situation may be a continuing offence, irrespective of the date and time of commission of the scheduled offence. In other words, the criminal activity may have been committed before the same had been notified as scheduled offence for the purpose of the 2002 Act, but if a person has indulged in or continues to indulge directly or indirectly in dealing with proceeds of crime, derived or obtained from such criminal activity even after it has been notified as scheduled offence, may be liable to be prosecuted for offence of money laundering under the 2002 Act – for continuing to possess or conceal the proceeds of crime (fully or in part) or retaining possession thereof or uses it in trenches until fully exhausted. The Offence of money laundering is not dependent on or linked to the date on which the scheduled offence, or if we may say so, the predicate offence has been committed. The relevant date is the date on which the person indulges in the process or activity connected with such proceeds of crime. These ingredients are intrinsic in the original provision (Section 3, as amended until 2013 and were in force till 31-7-2019); and the same has been merely explained and clarified by way of Explanation vide Finance (No.2) Act, 2019. Thus understood, inclusion of clause (ii) in the Explanation inserted in 2019 is of no consequence as it does not alter or enlarge the scope of Section 3 at all."

(Emphasis supplied)

24. In the present case, the material on record establishes that the misuse of power and position by the appellant, coupled with the alleged utilization and concealment of proceeds of crime, has had an enduring impact. The act of



laundering money is not a one-time occurrence but rather a process that continues so long as the benefits derived from criminal activity remain in circulation within the financial system or are being actively utilized by the accused. The respondent has submitted that fresh instances of the utilization of the proceeds of crime have surfaced even in recent times, thereby extending the offence into the present and negating the appellant's contention that the act was confined to a particular point in the past.

25. The law recognizes that money laundering is not a static event but an ongoing activity, as long as illicit gains are possessed, projected as legitimate, or reintroduced into the economy. Thus, the argument that the offence is not continuing does not hold good in law or on facts, and therefore, the judgment of the High Court cannot be set aside on this ground. Even if examined in the context of the present case, the appellant's contention does not hold water. The material on record indicates the continued and repeated misuse of power and position by the appellant, resulting in the generation and utilization of proceeds of crime over an extended period. The respondent has successfully demonstrated prima facie that the appellant remained involved in financial



transactions linked to proceeds of crime beyond the initial point of commission. The utilization of such proceeds, the alleged layering and integration, and the efforts to project such funds as untainted all constitute elements of a continuing offence under the PMLA. Thus, the proceedings initiated against the appellant are well within the legal framework and cannot be assailed on this ground."

5. The appellant/petitioners assailed the act of the Enforcement Directorate on the ground that penalising a person for any act done in the past on the basis of subsequent legislation is prohibited by Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India. In fact, going by the pleadings and records produced before us, it appears that the appellant/petitioners are not being proceeded against under the PMLA for any criminal act done by them before the commencement of the PMLA. In relation to an act done by a person before the commencement of the PMLA or the amendment to its schedule, the penal consequences will follow only if



the accused uses/puts into circulation the tainted money obtained by the past act, or when he projects that it is untainted money or when he does any other acts as defined in Section 3, after the commencement of the PMLA and the amendment to its schedule in 2009.

6. Article 20(1) of the Constitution declares that a person shall not be convicted for any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of commission of the act. The expression 'law in force' refers to a law that is factually in operation at the time when the offence is committed, in contrast to a law 'deemed to be in force' due to the retrospective operation of a subsequently enacted law. This interdiction cannot be extended to a case of the above nature where a person is allegedly using the proceeds of crime or projecting or claiming it as untainted property, after the commencement of the relevant statutory provision. In that case, there is no question



of retrospective operation of a penal law. There is only a reference in the statute to a past action, which is only for the identification of the subject - *the proceeds of crime*. There is no penal consequence for the past act done by him, under the PMLA.

7. In view of the authoritative pronouncement made by the Apex Court and in the light of the above discussion, the main contentions raised in the above matter do not survive.

8. However, Sri.Reghuraj, the learned Senior Counsel as instructed by Sri. Vivek Menon, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, raised another legal issue. It is submitted that unless the person accused of an offence under Section 3 of the PMLA is convicted of the predicate offence by a court of law, he cannot be penalized for the offence allegedly committed by him under Section 3 of the PMLA. If that is the case, there is no point in proceeding with the trial of the offence under the PMLA unless and until



the accused is convicted of the predicate offence, it is contended. Therefore, it is suggested that the trial of the offence under the PMLA should be kept in abeyance until the conclusion of the trial of the predicate offence.

9. Sri.Jaishankar V.Nair, the learned Retainer Counsel for the Enforcement Directorate submitted that such a course, if adopted, would seriously prejudice the Enforcement Directorate. According to him, if the trial of the predicate offence is delayed and the trial under the PMLA is kept suspended till its conclusion, the important witnesses to prove the offence under the PMLA might not be available at the time when the trial ultimately commences. The better course is to proceed with both matters simultaneously but not to pronounce the judgment in the PMLA case until the accused is convicted of the predicate offence, it is submitted.

10. We find merit in the submissions made by both sides. The issue, on one hand, is that if the trial of



the offence under PMLA proceeds by examining all the witnesses by spending invaluable judicial time, it would become a futile exercise if the accused is ultimately acquitted in the predicate offence. On the other hand, if the trial of the offence under the PMLA is kept in limbo until the conclusion of the trial of the predicate offence, the Enforcement Directorate may even lose the most valuable evidence by that time.

11. In this circumstance, we deem it appropriate to leave the matter for the just decision of the trial court. Depending upon the nature of each case, it can take a balanced course. The court may, in its discretion, permit the Enforcement Directorate to examine those witnesses who are required to prove the most important elements of the crime (such as the act of using the proceeds of crime or projecting or claiming it as untainted) while the trial of the predicate offence is pending. In such cases, the court may keep the examination of the rest of the witnesses



in abeyance until the conclusion of the trial.

12. The procedural and adjective law applicable to the criminal trial permits the criminal courts to adopt such a course when it is essential. In this regard, it is beneficial to consider Section 253 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita ('Sanhita", for short). It reads:

"If the accused refuses to plead, or does not plead, or claims to be tried or is not convicted under section 252, **the Judge shall fix a date for the examination of witnesses, and may, on the application of the prosecution, issue any process for compelling the attendance of any witness** or the production of any document or other thing."

(Emphasis added)

The expression 'may... *issue any process for compelling the attendance of any witness*' confers ample discretion to the trial court for taking a decision as to which of the witnesses are to be summoned before the court. Section 254(1) of the Sanhita states that on the date fixed for the examination of witnesses, the Judge shall



proceed to take *all such evidence* as may be produced in support of the prosecution. If the court decides not to issue process to certain witnesses, by exercising its discretion under Section 253, the court is not bound to examine them on the date fixed for the prosecution evidence. Given this scheme of the Sanhita regarding criminal trials, it is evident that Section 253 of the Sanhita, which corresponds to Section 230 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, empowers the Criminal Courts to decide which witnesses should be summoned first while fixing a date for the prosecution evidence. Section 140 of the Bharatiya Sakshiya Adhiniyam also enables the trial court, at its discretion, to decide the order in which the witnesses are to be produced and examined before the court, in the absence of a law regulating such order. However, if the court finds that the above course prejudices either side, it should proceed with the trial in a full-fledged manner and postpone the pronouncement of judgment until the trial



of the predicate offence is concluded.

13. It is further contended that there are no materials to attract the offences alleged against the respective parties and hence the proceedings are liable to be quashed on that sole ground. We do not agree. Except in one case, all the cases are at the stage of investigation. The materials available before us *prima facie* indicate that the Directorate initiated actions against the appellant/petitioners under the PMLA on the basis of some materials. The sufficiency of the materials for attracting the penal offences is a matter to be looked into by the trial court. Based on the interim directions of this court, the Enforcement Directorate has not submitted a final report in those cases. The parties are at liberty to raise such disputes as and when a situation arises. They can also challenge the criminal proceedings if there are no materials to show that they did not commit any act as above said, subsequent to the passing of the PMLA or



the amendment made to its schedule.

14. In view of the above discussion, it is to be concluded that the challenge raised in the above cases deserves no merit, except to the extent we noticed above.

In the result, the Writ Appeal and the Writ Petitions are dismissed, subject to the above observations.

Sd/-

A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE

JUDGE

Sd/-

P.KRISHNA KUMAR

JUDGE

SV



APPENDIX OF WP(C) 5562/2017

PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS

- EXHIBIT P1** A TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PARTS OF THE SCHEDULE TO PREVENTION OF MONEY-LAUNDERING ACT, 2002 AS IT ORIGINALLY STOOD TILL IT WAS AMENDED AS PER THE PREVENTION OF MONEY-LAUNDERING (AMENDMENT) ACT 2009.
- EXHIBIT P2** A TRUE COPY OF THE FIR IN V C NO.8/2011 OF VACAB, PALAKKAD
- EXHIBIT P3** A TRUE COPY OF THE GAZETTE OF INDIA DATED 06.03.2009 PUBLISHING THE PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2009
- EXHIBIT P4** A TRUE COPY OF THE SUMMONS DATED 07.07.2016 ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT DIRECTING THE PETITIONER TO APPEAR ON 08.08.2016
- EXHIBIT P5** A TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 06.08.2016 SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE RESPONDENT ON 08.08.2016 THROUGH HIS REPRESENTATIVE.
- EXHIBIT P6** A TRUE COPY OF THE SUMMONS DATED 08.08.2016 ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT DIRECTING THE PETITIONER TO APPEAR IN PERSON ON 31.08.2016
- EXHIBIT P7** A TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 02.09.2016 EXCLUDING THE DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE RESPONDENT.
- EXHIBIT P8** A TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 26.12.2016 EXCLUDING THE DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE RESPONDENT.
- EXHIBIT P9** A TRUE COPY OF THE SUMMONS DATED 03.01.2017 ALONG WITH A LETTER DATED 03.01.2017 ISSUED BY



**THE RESPONDENT DIRECTING THE PETITIONER TO
APPEAR ON 06.02.2017**

**EXHIBIT P10 A TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 01.02.2017
EXCLUDING THE DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY THE
PETITIONER TO THE RESPONDENT.**

**EXHIBIT P11 A TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 01.02.2017
EXCLUDING THE DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY THE
PETITIONER TO THE RESPONDENT.**

**EXHIBIT P12 TRUE COPY OF THE ECIR NO.4/2015 OF SUB ZONE,
KOZHIKODE IN KOCHI ZONE INCLUDING ITS
ANNEXURES.**



APPENDIX OF WP(C) 5647/2017

PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS

- EXHIBIT P1 :** TRUE COPY OF THE SUMMONS
- EXHIBIT P2 :** TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT EXTRACT FROM THE
AUDIT REPORT OF COMPTROLLER AND AUDIT
GENERAL FOR THE YEAR ENDING 31ST MARCH
2010.
- EXHIBIT P3 :** TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGES OF THE CC
22/2011
- EXHIBIT P4 :** TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGES OF THE CC
2/2011.
- EXHIBIT P5 :** TRUE COPY OF THE GAZETTE OF INDIA
PUBLISHING THE PREVENTION OF MONEY
LAUNDERING (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2009.
- EXHIBIT P6 :** TRUE COPY OF THE ECIR/KZSZO/04/2015.



APPENDIX OF WP(C) 8373/2017

PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS

- | | |
|-------------------|--|
| EXHIBIT P1 | COPY OF THE NOTICE VIDE
F.NO.ECIR/K2520/4/2015/1065 DATED 19.8.2016
ISSUED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT TO THE
PETITIONER. |
| EXHIBIT P2 | COPY OF THE NOTICE VIDE
F.NO.ECIR/4/K2520/2015/2017 DATED 9.2.2017
ISSUED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT TO THE
PETITIONER. |
| EXHIBIT P3 | COPY OF THE RELEVANT PORTION OF THE FIR
FILED BEFORE THE ENQUIRY COMMISSIONER AND
SPECIAL JUDGE THRISSUR. |
| EXHIBIT P4 | COPY OF THE RELEVANT EXTRACT OF THE
PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT 2002. |
| EXHIBIT P5 | COPY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA GAZETTE
VIDE NO.24 DATED 6.3.2009 NOTIFYING THE
PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING (AMENDMENT)
ACT, 2009. |



APPENDIX OF WP(C) 26120/2017

PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS

- EXHIBIT P1: A TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PARTS OF THE SCHEDULE TO PREVENTION OF MONEY-LAUNDERING ACT, 2002 AS IT ORIGINALLY STOOD TILL IT WAS AMENDED AS PER THE PREVENTION OF MONEY-LAUNDERING (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2009.
- EXHIBIT P2: A TRUE COPY OF THE FIR IN V.C.NO.8/2011 OF VACB, PALAKKAD.
- EXHIBIT P3: A TRUE COPY OF THE GAZETTE OF INDIA DATED 6.3.2009 PUBLISHING THE PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2009.
- EXHIBIT P4: A TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED 1.3.2017 ISSUED BY THIS HON'BLE COURT IN WPC NO.5562/2017.
- EXHIBIT P5: A TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED 12.5.2017 ISSUED BY THIS HON'BLE COURT IN WPC NO.5562/2017.
- EXHIBIT P6: A TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED 29.5.2017 ISSUED BY THIS HON'BLE COURT IN WPC NO.5562/2017 EXTENDING THE ORDER OF STATUS QUO.
- EXHIBIT P7: A TRUE COPY OF THE SUMMONS DATED 7.7.2017 ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT TO THE PETITIONER.
- EXHIBIT P8: A TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY DATED 17.7.2017 SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER TO THE 2ND RESPONDENT.
- EXHIBIT.P9 TRUE COPY OF THE ECIR NO.4/2015 OF SUB ZONE,



EXHIBIT.P10 **KOZHIKODE IN KOCHI ZONE EXCLUDING ITS
ANNEXURES**
**TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED.10.4.2024
IN SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL[CRIMINAL] NO.
4768/2024**