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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

+ **W.P.(C) 6500/2025**

DIVYA MATTEY AND ORS

.....Petitioners

Through: Mr. Manish Gupta, Mr. Sandeep Gupta, Ms. Deepti Verma, Mr. Rishabh Rai and Mr. Yeshraj, Advs.

versus

L G GNCTD AND ORS

.....Respondents

Through: Mr. Pinaki Misra, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Puneet Mittal, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Bhuvan Gugnani, Ms. Sakshi Mendiratta, Mr. Sameer Vatts, Mr. Abhisumat Gupta, Mr. Rupender Sharma and Ms. Nupur Mantoo, Advs. for DPS Dwarka.
Mr. Sameer Vashishtha, Standing Counsel for DoE.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKAS MAHAJAN

ORDER

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16.05.2025

CM APPL. 29606/2025, CM APPL. 29607/2025 & CM APPL. 29608/2025 (exemption)

1. Allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
2. The applications stand disposed of.

W.P.(C) 6500/2025

3. The present petition has been filed seeking following reliefs:

“a. Issue appropriate directions/Orders to the Respondent No. 1 to decide the pending representations of the Petitioners within a period of two weeks and;

b. Issue appropriate directions/Orders to the Respondent No. 1 to call upon the entire record which is part of this Writ Petition and any other record which the Respondent No. 1 from the office of



the Respondent DOE, Delhi which seems appropriate to ascertain and examine the non-compliance by the school of the administrative and judicial orders of the DOE, Delhi and this Hon'ble Court respectively and;

*c. Issue appropriate directions/Orders to the Respondent No. 1 to issue written directions to the Respondent DOE, Delhi to ensure strict compliance with the directions dated 19.01.2016 of the Ld. Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court in **"Justice for all vs. GNCTD of Delhi and Ors."** in W.P. (C) bearing no. 4109 of 2013 and the Review Order dated 27.07.2016 and the Order dated 23.01.2017 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP (C) 8026/2016 and 6046/2016 and the Order dated 27.10.2022 in LPA - 230/2019 and no unapproved fee at any cost shall be charged from the Petitioners/Parents of the school, unless approved by the DOE, Delhi.*

d. Issue appropriate directions to Respondent No. 1 to issue appropriate directions to the Respondent DOE, Delhi of permanent nature to ensure no discrimination shall take place against any child in any manner and the recommendations of the Ld. District Magistrate and a team of officers of DOE, Delhi dated 04.04.2025 should be circulated in the larger interest of the interest of the students studying in the school."

4. The petitioners in the present case are the parents of students studying in Delhi Public School, Dwarka (hereinafter referred as 'DPS-Dwarka' or 'the school'). The case of the petitioners as set out in the writ petition is that the respondent no.3/DoE had passed an administrative order dated 22.05.2024 in exercise of its powers under Section 18(5) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred as 'the Act') read with Sections 17(3), 24(1) of the Act and Rule 180(3) of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 (hereinafter referred as 'the Rules'), thereby rejecting the fee hike proposal of the school pertaining to the academic year 2023-24. The directions passed in the said order dated 22.05.2024 are as under:



“Further, the management of said School is hereby directed under section 24(3) of DSEAR 1973 to comply with the following directions:

1. Not to increase any fee in pursuance to the proposal submitted by school on any account for the academic session 2023-24 and if the fee is already increased and charged for the academic session 2023-24, the same shall be refunded to the parents or adjusted in the fee of subsequent months.

2. To ensure payment of salary is made in accordance with the provision of Section 10(1) of the DSEA, 1973. Further, the scarcity of funds cannot be the reason for non-payment of salary and other benefits admissible to the teachers/staffs in accordance with the section 10(1) of the DSEA, 1973. Therefore, the Society running the school must ensure payment to teachers/staffs accordingly.

3. To utilize the fee collected from students in accordance with the provisions of Rule 177 of the DSER, 1973 and orders and directions issued by this Directorate from time to time.”

Non-compliance of this order or any direction herein shall be viewed seriously and will be dealt with the accordance with the provisions of section 24(4) of Delhi School Education Act, 1973 and Delhi School Education Rules, 1973”

5. The grievance ventilated in the petition is *inter alia* that the aforesaid order has neither been complied with by the school, nor has the DoE made any efforts to enforce its own order despite there being several requests, communications and complaints by the parents. It is stated that the school, in complete disregard of the order dated 22.05.2024, has not only failed to refund the excess and unapproved fee charged by them, but on the contrary, has been demanding increased fee from the parents and striking off the names of their wards from school rolls, thereby harassing them and not allowing them to sit in the classes.

6. It has further been stated that pursuant to the order dated 22.05.2024,



the DoE has subsequently passed the order dated 28.05.2024 against the Management of DPS-Dwarka, directing them *inter alia* not to put the students to any academic loss, ensuring that no student is subjected to ill treatment and that they are allowed to continue in the respective classes for their studies. The relevant part of the said order reads as under:

“Now, in view of the above, the Management of DPS, Dwarka, New Delhi is hereby directed that the students are not put to any academic loss, there should not be any ill treatment to the students and the students should be allowed to continue in the class for their studies and to appear in the Mid Term Examination also in the interest of their studies. There should not be any discrimination among the students and studies of students should not suffer. The management of DPS, Dwarka, New Delhi is further directed to comply with the orders No.F.DE.15(94)/PSB/2024/2464-2469 dated 22.05.2024 and submit the compliance of the order.”

7. The DoE, thereafter, passed another order dated 05.06.2024 on the various complaints from the parents, whereby taking note of the fact that the school has neither complied with the aforesaid orders of the DoE, nor has it furnished any reply to the same, it directed the school to re-instate the names of the students whose names have been struck off from the school rolls for not paying the unapproved hiked fee. The DoE also reiterated the observations and directions contained in its previous orders. The relevant part of the order dated 05.06.2024 reads as under:

“And whereas, this office is in receipt of several complaints from the parents mentioning that the Delhi Public School, Sec.-3, Dwarka has not yet reinstated the names of their wards who have not paid the unapproved hiked fee, further some aggrieved parents have visited this office on 03.06.2024 & 05.06.2024 and met DDE, Zone-21 alongwith their written submission that their issues have not been resolved yet and name of their wards have not been



reinstated by the school.

In view of the above, the Principal/Manager of Delhi Public School, Sec.-3, Dwarka, Delhi is again directed to reinstate the names of students whose names were struck off from the school rolls. It is also directed that the students are not put to any academic loss, there should not be any ill-treatment to the students and there should not be any discrimination among the students and comply with the directions issued by this office vide order dated 28.05.2024.

Non Compliance of the directions will be viewed seriously and the matter will be taken up with competent authority for initiating necessary actions as per provisions of DSEAR, 1973.”

8. Similar orders have been passed by the DoE to the Management of the school on 31.12.2024 and 27.03.2025 directing compliance of the earlier orders and furnishing a compliance report in that regard by 28.03.2025.

9. It is stated that subsequently, the DoE *vide* order dated 03.04.2025 constituted a committee for carrying out inspection of DPS-Dwarka on 04.04.2025 and directed the said committee to visit the school, verify the veracity of the complaints received by the office of DoE regarding any discriminatory tactic being employed by the school against the students and submit a report. The said committee submitted its report dated 04.04.2025 wherein it observed that on the basis of fee hike dispute the students were not allowed regular classes, rather they were made to sit in the library. Consequently, the DoE issued a show cause notice dated 08.04.2025 to the school as a final notice before initiation of action under Section 24(3) read with Rule 56 of DSEAR, 1973.

10. Taking cognizance of the findings in the aforesaid report dated 04.04.2025, this Court in W.P.(C) 10434/2024, wherein the school has challenged the action initiated at the instance of National Commission for



Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR), passed the following directions *vide* order dated 16.04.2025:

“10. In the meantime, as an interim measure, in view of the aforesaid circumstances, the petitioner school is restrained from indulging in the kind of conduct referred to in the inspection report viz.

- (i) confining the students in the library of the school;*
- (ii) preventing students from attending classes;*
- (iii) segregating the students who have not paid the fees;*
- (iv) preventing the said students from interacting with the other students;*
- (v) preventing the said students from having access to all amenities of the school.*
- (vi) subjecting such students to any other form of discrimination / prejudice.*

11. The school will also allocate section/s to students who have been promoted to the next/ higher class; any controversy/ dispute as regards fees shall not be a ground for not doing so. As observed herein above, any controversy/ dispute as regards the fees to be charged by the school shall be resolved in the manner contemplated under the statute and the rules framed thereunder, and/or in terms of direction/s issued in pending judicial proceedings, where the said issue is under consideration.

12. The Respondent/DOE and the concerned District Magistrate are directed to conduct regular inspections to ensure that the above directions are complied with.”

11. It has further been stated that although, the school has assailed the orders of the DoE rejecting fee hike proposals of DPS-Dwarka and the said challenge is pending before this Court under Writ Petitions bearing no. 12232/2022, 12254/2022, 11653/2022 and 14640/2024, however, no stay on operation of the orders of the DoE has been granted. It is thus, stated that the said orders are still in operation and ought to be complied with.

12. Mr. Manish Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the



petitioners submits that the school, being a private unaided recognized school, which has been allotted land by Delhi Development Authority with the condition to seek prior approval from the DoE before increasing the fee, is bound to comply with the same. In this regard, he places reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in ***Justice for All v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors., 2016 SCC OnLine Del 355*** (hereinafter referred as '***Justice for All I***') and the order dated 27.07.2016 passed in the subsequent Review Petition No.129/2016 in ***Justice for All v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors.*** (hereinafter referred as '***Justice for All II***'). He has further referred to the order dated 23.01.2017 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP(C) 8026/2016 and 6046/2016 whereby the SLP filed by the schools with the land allotment clause were dismissed outrightly by the Full Bench, to contend that the law laid down by the Division Bench has attained finality and therefore, is binding upon the school as well as the DoE.

13. Mr. Gupta submits that reliance placed by the school, time and again, on the decision of this Court in ***Action Committee v. Directorate of Education & Anr., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 7591*** (hereinafter referred as '***Action Committee I***') is misplaced inasmuch as the said judgment is in appeal before the Division Bench of this Court in LPA 230/2019, wherein *vide* order dated 15.03.2019, the said judgment has been stayed. The order of stay passed by the Division Bench has been made absolute *vide* order dated 27.10.2022.

14. He further contends that the school is bound by the conditions stipulated in the letter of allotment once the same have been accepted. He submits that the allottee cannot breach the terms of the allotment and indulge in profiteering with the aid of public property. In this regard, he



relies on the decision of the Division Bench in *Social Jurist, A Lawyer's Group vs. GNCT of Delhi and Ors.*, 140 (2007) DLT 698.

15. Having heard Mr. Gupta, and regard being had to the nature of relief sought in the present petition, as well as, the interim relief, this Court is of the opinion that the Delhi Public School, Dwarka is a necessary party.

16. Accordingly, on oral request of Mr. Manish Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners, Delhi Public School, Dwarka is impleaded as respondent no.4. Let amended memo of parties be filed before the next date.

17. In view of the submissions noted above, issue notice. Mr. Sameer Vashishtha, Standing Counsel for GNCTD accepts notice on behalf of the respondents 1 to 3. Ms. Sakshi Mendiratta accepts notice on behalf of the respondent no.4/DPS, Dwarka.

18. Let counter-affidavit be filed within a period of four weeks from today.

19. Rejoinder thereto, if any, be filed within two weeks thereafter.

20. Re-notify on 28.08.2025.

CM APPL. 29605/2025 (by the petitioners under Section 151 CPC seeking interim relief)

21. The interim reliefs sought by the petitioners in the present application are as under:

“a) Issue appropriate directions/orders to the Respondent No. 1 to issue direction to the Respondent DOE, Delhi that till the final disposal of the instant Writ Petition, the DOE, Delhi shall ensure that the School of the Petitioner's ward shall strictly comply with the Order of the Division Bench, Review Order, Supreme Court and the Order dated 27.10.2022 passed in LPA 230/2019 and;

b) Issue appropriate direction/s orders to the Respondent No. 1 to issue directions to the Respondent DOE, Delhi that till the final



disposal of the instant Writ Petition, the DOE, Delhi shall ensure that the school of the Petitioner's wards shall strictly charge only the approved fee for the academic session 2025-26 and onwards in the light of the judgment."

22. Issue notice. Mr. Sameer Vashishtha, Standing Counsel for GNCTD accepts notice on behalf of the respondents 1 to 3. Ms. Sakshi Mendiratta accepts notice on behalf of the DPS, Dwarka.

23. Let reply to the application be filed within a period of four weeks from today.

24. Rejoinder thereto, if any, be filed within two weeks thereafter.

25. At the outset it may be specifically stated that any discrimination and victimization of the students on the ground of non-payment of hiked fee cannot be countenanced. The school and the DoE shall remain bound by the interim directions passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) 10434/2024 *vide* order dated 16.04.2025, relevant part of which has been extracted in paragraph 10 above.

26. The petitioners in the present application have questioned the proposed fee hike for the current academic year 2025-26 and any further hikes for subsequent years as being contrary to the judgments in ***Justice for All I*** and ***Justice for All II***, as well as, the order of the Division Bench in LPA No. 230/2019. Thus, the case of the petitioners, in concise, is that the decision in ***Action Committee I*** has been stayed, therefore, the school cannot ask for hiked fee without prior approval from DoE.

27. This Court in ***Naya Samaj Parents Association through its Present vs. Apeejay School Sheikh Sarai & Anr., 2025:DHC:4185***, had an occasion to deal with similar submissions. Rejecting the contention that the decision in ***Action Committee I*** could not be relied upon since it has been stayed, this



Court observed as under:

*“28. The Coordinate Bench of this Court, after examining various decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as well as, of this Court on the issue, held that what is proscribed is indulgence in profiteering and charging of capitation fee, thereby “commercialising” education, but there is no requirement for the school to take prior approval of the DoE before enhancing its fee. The only obligation on the School under Section 17(3) of the Delhi School Education Act is to submit its statement of fee in terms of the said provision. It was further laid down that if pending the decision of DoE on the School’s Statement of Fee, the school decided to commence charging the enhanced fee from the beginning of the next academic session, it cannot be said that the school had, in any manner, infringed the provisions of the DSE Act or the DSE Rules. Incidentally, the judgment in **Action Committee I**, took note of the decision in **Modern School** (supra), as well as, decision of this Court in **Justice for All** (supra). The relevant para from **Action Committee I** reads thus:*

“207. Proceeding, now, to the merits of the impugned Order, i.e., to the validity of the objection, by the DoE, regarding non-obtaining, by the petitioner, “prior approval” of the DoE, before enhancing its fees, it would become apparent, from a reading of the discussion hereinabove, and the law laid down by the various decisions cited in that regard, that, in the matter of fixation of fees, the distinction, between the rights of unaided non-minority schools, and unaided minority schools, is practically chimerical. In both cases, the schools are entitled to complete autonomy in the matter of fixation of their fees and management of their accounts, subject only to the condition that they do not indulge in profiteering, and do not charge capitation fee, thereby “commercialising” education. There is no requirement for the school to take “prior approval”, of the DoE, before enhancing its fees. The only responsibility, on the School, is to submit its statement of fee, as required by Section 17(3) of the DSE Act. Mr. Gupta is right in his submission that, having done so, the schools could not be expected to



wait ad infinitum, before the said statement of fees, submitted by them, was examined and verified by the DoE. Any such examination and verification, too, it is clarified, would have to be limited to the issue of whether, by fixing its fees, or enhancing the same, the school was “commercialising” education, either by charging capitation fee or by indulging in profiteering. If, therefore, pending the decision of the DoE on its Statement of Fee, the school decided to commence charging the enhanced fee from the beginning of the next academic session, it cannot be said that the school had, in any manner, infringed the provisions of the DSE Act or the DSE Rules.”

(emphasis supplied)

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30. The Coordinate Bench of this Court relying upon the decision in the **Action Committee I**, vide order dated 29.04.2024 observed that unaided recognised private schools are not required to take prior approval of the DoE before increasing its fee, irrespective of whether the land clause does or does not apply to it. The Court also noted that the operation of the judgment in **Action Committee I** has not been stayed in the intra court appeal carried to the Hon’ble Division Bench against the said judgment in **LPA 230/2019** titled as **Directorate of Education vs. Action Committee Unaided Recognised Private Schools**, though, interim order was passed only to the extent that the ‘land clause’ school would not collect the amount constituting interim fee hike in terms of order dated 17.10.2017 issued by the DoE. The relevant excerpt from the interim order dated 03.04.2019 passed in **LPA 230/2019** reads thus:

“6. Till the next date of hearing, none of the land clause Schools will proceed to collect the amount constituting the interim fee hike in terms of 17th October 2017 circular issued by Appellant No.1.”

31. In this backdrop, the Court observed that there was no interference, interlocutory or otherwise with the decision of the judgment in **Action Committee I** that, before hiking fees, unaided recognised school is not required to obtain prior approval of the



DoE.

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34. Further, as noted above an interim order was passed in LPA 230/2019 limited to the aspect that none of the land clause Schools will proceed to collect the amount constituting the interim fee hike in terms of 17th October 2017 circular issued by DoE. It is apparent that the said interim direction was issued to preserve the status quo as regard collection of amount constituting interim fee hike in terms of aforesaid circular, till the matter is finally decided in the said LPA laying down a binding precedent.

35. The fact, however, remains that the judgment in Action Committee I has not been quashed or set aside. The law is well settled that even where the operation of a judgment has been stayed or kept in abeyance, the reasoning of the judgment still continues to operate and exist, till the judgment itself is set aside.

36. In this regard, reference could profitably be made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. vs. Church of South India Trust Association CSI Cinod Secretariat, Madras, (1992) 3 SCC 1**, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that a stay on the operation of an order only means that the stayed order would not be operative from the date of passing of the order, and it does not mean that the said order has been wiped out from existence. The relevant portion of the decision reads as under:

“10..... While considering the effect of an interim order staying the operation of the order under challenge, a distinction has to be made between quashing of an order and stay of operation of an order. Quashing of an order results in the restoration of the position as it stood on the date of passing of the order which has been quashed. The stay of operation of an order does not, however, lead to such a result. It only means that the order which has been stayed would not be operative from the date of passing of the stay order, and it does not mean that the said order has been wiped out from existence. This means that if an order passed by the appellate authority is quashed and the matter is remanded, the result would be that the appeal which had been disposed of by the said order of the appellate authority



would be restored and it can be said to be pending before the appellate authority after the quashing of the order of the appellate authority. The same cannot be said with regard to an order staying the operation of the order of the appellate authority because in spite of the said order, the order of the appellate authority continues to exist in law and so long as it exists, it cannot be said that the appeal which has been disposed of by the said order has not been disposed of and is still pending. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the passing of the interim order dated February 21, 1991 by the Delhi High Court staying the operation of the order of the appellate authority dated January 7, 1991 does not have the effect of reviving the appeal which had been dismissed by the appellate authority by its order dated January 7, 1991 and it cannot be said that after February 21, 1991, the said appeal stood revived and was pending before the appellate authority.”

(emphasis supplied)

37. The principle enunciated in the aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has further been employed by the Division Bench of this Court in **Principal Commissioner of C. Ex., Delhi-I vs. Space Telelink Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine Del 12910** wherein the Division Bench observed as follows:

“8. The revalue has argued that the Supreme Court has entertained a Special Leave Petition against the judgment of the Gujarat and Madras High Courts and furthermore, granted a stay of proceedings and that in these circumstances, the law declared in those judgments are no longer applicable : This sub mission is fallacious because in Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Association, (1992) 3 SCC 1, the Supreme Court had observed as follows:

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*9. It is apparent therefore, that **an order keeping in abeyance the judgment of a lower Court or authority does not deface the underlying basis of the judgment itself, i.e.***



its reasoning.”

(emphasis supplied)

38. *In regard to the submission of Mr. Jha that the view taken by this Court in **Action Committee II** is only a tentative view and does not have a binding value, it is to be noted that order in **Action Committee II** has relied upon this Court’s earlier judgment in **Action Committee I** which continues to hold the field. Therefore, the law expounded in **Action Committee I** that the schools are not required to obtain prior approval for increasing tuition fee irrespective of whether it is land clause school or not, as noted in **Action Committee II**, is the extant legal position.”*

28. Therefore, the law as it stands today, permits the school to fix the fee fees as per its projected expenses without prior approval of the DoE. However, the statement of fee submitted by school before the commencement of each academic session, in terms of Section 17(3) of the DSE Act, is subject to the decision of DoE since under the said provision the DoE has the authority to regulate the quantum of fee charged by unaided schools. Thus, it is open to DoE to see whether such fixation is irrational or arbitrary which results in “profiteering” or “commercialisation”. If the DoE finds in affirmative, it can pass an appropriate order, including an order rejecting enhancement of fee with consequent direction to roll back the hiked fee.

29. To be noted, the issue regarding fee hike concerning academic year 2023-24 has already been reviewed and decided by the DoE *vide* order dated 22.05.2024, whereby the DoE has rejected the fee hike after duly analysing the audited financial statements of the school. The said order has been challenged by the school by filing W.P.(C) 14640/2024 but no stay has been granted in the said petition. Therefore, the school has to comply with the order dated 22.05.2024 passed by the DoE, till the time it is stayed or set



aside.

30. However, the interim relief sought by the petitioners in the present case with regard to the subsequent academic years including current year 2025-26 does not persuade this Court inasmuch as nothing has been placed on record to show that the DoE has rejected the fixation of fee by the school for the academic session 2024-25 onwards. Until and unless the DoE reviews the financial statements of the school and on its findings, rejects the statement of fee providing for enhancement for the academic sessions 2024-25 onwards on the touch stone of “profiteering” and “commercialisation” of education, the enunciation of law as noted above does not provide for any embargo on such enhancement of fee.

31. In that view of the matter, the parents of the students studying in DPS-Dwarka ought to pay the fee as per the statements of fee submitted by the school for the academic sessions 2024-25 onwards, till the time the DoE takes a decision on the same, and further subject to the final outcome of the present writ petition.

32. Mr. Pinaki Misra and Mr. Puneet Mittal, learned senior counsels appearing on behalf of respondent no.4/DPS-Dwarka, on instructions, fairly state that the school is amenable to the petitioners paying 50% of the hiked school fee.

33. Therefore, it is directed that the wards of the petitioners shall be allowed to continue their studies in their respective classes till the pendency of the present petition subject to the parents depositing 50% of the hiked school fee for the academic years 2024-25 onwards. It is clarified that the rebate of 50% is on the hiked component of the fee, the base fee shall be paid in full. It is further clarified that the dues in terms of the present order



with regard to the wards of the petitioners shall be calculated after adjusting the excess fee collected for the year 2023-24, in terms of DoE's order dated 22.05.2024. The parties are, however, at liberty to seek variation or modification of the directions contained in the present order, in the altered circumstances.

34. At this stage, Mr. Pinaki Misra, learned Senior Counsel for Delhi Public School, Dwarka has drawn attention of the Court to certain complaints filed with the Bar Council of India by some of the petitioners in the present case against Mr. Puneet Mittal, Senior Advocate. The said complaint alleges misconduct under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and further alleges delaying the proceedings of this Court. In the complaint, it has been alleged that the learned senior counsel sought adjournment before this Court in a connected matter citing personal difficulties, however, on the same date, he was appearing before another Bench of this Court.

35. Mr. Manish Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners' states that any such complaint by any of the petitioners was not filed in consultation with him and he also expresses his disapproval for the action taken by the parents.

36. In the considered opinion of this Court, such complaints made by the parents are unwarranted and unacceptable. The order relied upon by the parents have been completely misread whereby adjournment was sought on personal grounds of the briefing counsel and not of the learned senior counsel. It has to be borne in mind that advocates appearing for either side before this Court are officers in assistance of this Court and they ought to be respected as such. The parties shall refrain from writing about counsels appearing for the opposite sides. Mr. Gupta is requested to counsel the



petitioners in this regard.

37. Re-notify on 28.08.2025.

MAY 16, 2025
N.S. ASWAL

VIKAS MAHAJAN, J